Creating Law in the UK

Creating virtue in the UKParliament is the supreme legal philosophy-making body in the UK. Statutes are supra all, and Judges role is to apply and find the statutes. There are four-spot rules of playation, which have developed throughout the history and nigh of which after immense lasting disputes. rectitude in the UK is to a fault dependant on the EU law, which should be stronger that domestic law. There are several courts in fall in Kingdom, on the top of the hierarchy lies the Supreme Court, any reason congeal there, muckle non be overruled by any some other court. Judges job is to interpret statutes, and in some faux pass, to adopt law. But is it true that settle can make saucily law? Here I am issue to discuss whether judges do in some elusions make new law, or do they apply the existing statutes and coarse law cases.The Law in United Kingdom comes as legislation, from the Acts of Parliament, or, from Common Law decisions of the courts ready as actors. Leg islation is superior to all other sources of law judges job is to interpret and apply them in courts. Common Law is historically the oldest source of law in the UK, all the law used to be made by judges on authority of the monarch. agents ensure the outgrowth of the legal system. So, this raises a question are judges still considered as law makers in United Kingdom? The traditional trend of discriminatory law making is that judges should play no part in creative law making, they should just declare it. The declaratory theory of law, resplendently introduced by William Blackstvirtuoso on the eighteenth century, stated the idea that judges do not make the law but only declare what it has incessantly been1. The theory was famously opposed by John Austin in Lectures on Jurisprudence Or, The philosophical system of Positive Law as adolescent fiction2. Nowadays the Declaratory guess is widely opposed, it does not seem to go together with todays changing society and technological developing. In his book, Lord Reid called the opinion that judges only declare law and do not make it a fairy tale that is not believed anymore3. Therefore, there has been a dole out of debate on whether Blackst aces theory is correct and judges do not actually make law but merely declare it. afterward legislation comes Common Law precedents set by previous decisions of cases, which is also a source of law making in the UK. The ism of Precedent It is based on two principles position of a court in the court hierarchy and how similar is the mixture of law and fact in the two cases being considered. The key feature in common law cases is stare decisis, which means to stand by things decided. Highest is the Supreme Court (previously accommodate of Lords), which is not bound by its own previous decisions. As tell by Lord Chancellor Gardiner in The Practice Statement, that too hard adherence to precedent may lead to injustice and restrict the development of the law, which is why H ouse of Lords should be able to depart from previous decisions4. The Doctrine of Precedent is meant to lead to predictable and consistent development of legal principles, and the background for the Practice Statement was that if courts are strongly bound by precedent the law cannot evolve. It is rarely used, though, but sometimes controversially. Like the case of R v Howe5 which overruled the case of Lynch v DPP for NI6, and fundamentally changed the defence of duress. By decision made in the case of Howe, in my opinion, judges did not make new law, but rather complemented it. On the contrast, in the case of R v R7, where marital rape was decided to be illegal, seemed wish a making of a new law by judges. So, in some cases the courts can overrule a certain previous precedent and in some cases, make new law.The primary law in UK comes as statutes. Four rules have developed throughout history to interpret statutes The true(a) rule, the golden rule, the mischief rule and the purposi ve approach, last one being the most modern. The Literal Rule states that the words of legislation should be given their ordinary natural meaning, though that might in some cases lead to an absurdity. Like in Fisher v Bell8 where the flick knives interchange were treated as an invitation to treat and was not therefore under the Act9 which all the way had the aim of prevent the exact matter. The second one, The Golden Rule, was described by Lord Wensleydale in grayness v Pearson as that if a literal meaning leads to absurdity, the grammatical sense of the word may be circumscribed to avoid it10. The Mischief Rule is laid out in Heydons case by four things to consider when interpreting statutes, which in summary consists of what was the common law before, what it was missing, and what is parliament trying to resolve 11. Now, the most modern one of the rules is The Purposive Approach, which stresses the need to interpret legislation in a way to achieve its objectives. This approach gives judges a lot of flexibility of decision making cases, and might look like it gives judges the power to make law. about interpreting statutes, Lord Simonds stated in his opinion against interpretation of statutes other than in a literal way, that the duty of courts is to interpret words as they are, however ambiguous they are, it is still not up to the judges to move around outside them on a voyage of discovery1 The Declaratory Theory of Law Oxford J Legal studies (2013)2 The Declaratory Theory of Law Oxford J Legal Studies (2013), originally from John Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence Or, The Philosophy of Positive Law3 Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker (1972) 12 J Soc Public Teachers L 22 http//heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/sptlns12div=10id=page= assessed 18 march 20174 The Practice Statement, House of Lords 1966 3 exclusively ER 775 R v Howe and another and another appeal 1987 1 on the whole ER 7716 Lynch v Director of Public Prosecutions for N orthern Ireland 1975 1 alone ER 9137 R v R(Rape marital exemption) 1991 4 All ER 4818 Fisher v Bell 1961 1 QB 394, 1960 3 All ER 7319 Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, s 1(1).10 John Grey and Others, -Appellants William Pearson and Others, -Respondents (1857) 10 ER 121611 (1584) 3 Coke 7a 76 E.R. 637